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On the Use of Currency Reform in Inflation Stabilization 
Daniel Heymann and Axel Leijonhufvud
Introduction
A successful deceleration of inflation will not by itself promise a 
future of monetary stability. That requires fiscal balance over the longer 
run and monetary discipline in each short run. The macroeconomic literature 
on inflation stabilization nonetheless tends to devote more attention to the 
problems of bringing down the inflation rate than to those of keeping it 
down - - perhaps because the former seem more technocratic and less 
fundamentally political than the latter.
Since the rational expectations approach became prominent in the 
1970's, credibility has become a central concept in almost all discussions 
of disinflation strategies. If the policy making authorities have or can 
establish credibility, it is often argued, they will be able to bring 
private sector inflation expectations into line with their policy targets 
and thus to avoid the contractionary consequences of a disinflationary 
policy that is less than fully anticipated. Credibility, therefore, seems 
to hold out the prospect that inflation might be quickly and drastically 
reduced without serious unemployment consequences. This prospect is at its 
most alluring for countries suffering such high inflation rates that 




























































































under those conditions the credibility of the authorities has very likely 
already been expended.
Even with credibility, however^, disinflation will redistribute wealth 
from debtors to creditors on outstanding contracts and give rise to 
unemployment through pre-existing labor contracts and through disruptions of 
credit. To abandon gradualism for a ''shock”-policy remains a gamble, 
therefore, even if the shock can be made credible, for one can never depend 
upon all private contracts being by mutual consent renegotiated so as to 
eliminate these consequences. The "memory" of past inflation embedded in 
contracts thus imparts inertia to the ongoing inflation.
In its 1985 "Austral Plan," Argentina included a type of currency 
reform which, under certain conditions, can be quite helpful in overcoming 
these problems. Variants of this reform have subsequently been tried by 
Brazil and by Peru and its possible use has been discussed also elsewhere. 
The conditions under which this type of currency reform can be recommended 
are not generally well understood, however. They are explored in this 
paper.
"Bluebacking"
The particular kind of currency reform considered here we call the
"blueback" scheme referring to an example previously used to illustrate the
2idea. This illustration may as well be made to serve once more:
Imagine an inflation corresponding in all essential respects to the 
assumptions of the neoclassical model of a fully anticipated inflation. For 
simplicity, take the case of a constant inflation rate. The aggregate price 



























































































at the same rate on average, although relative prices may show somewhat 
larger variability since nominal price adjustments need not be 
synchronized. Apart from possible effects of this kind, the inflation simply 
constitutes an tt% tax on cash-balances and it has no other social or 
economic consequences than those attributable to this tax. We may refer to 
it as a "quasi-neutral" inflation.
In this economy, a variety of contracts will exist but they will have 
one feature in common: all have been concluded on the firm expectation, 
shared by all parties, that the inflation will continue at the 7r% rate 
indefinitely. In this setting, the parties are able to calculate the 
anticipated real value of a future dated nominal payment without ambiguity.
Call the existing monetary unit the "greenback." The real purchasing 
power of greenbacks depreciates at the perfectly stable rate of tt% per 
period.^ A stable money of constant purchasing power, therefore, would 
appreciate relative to the greenback at tt% per period. Consider then the 
simple expedient of introducing a new currency (the "blueback") which by law 
grows in its capacity to extinguish greenback debt at 7r% per period.
On the day of this reform, bluebacks and greenbacks exchange at a one- 
to-one rate. But one period later, one blueback legally discharges a debt 
of 1+7T green units and t periods later, of course, the relationship is:
B - G/(l + tt)6
Thus, if the inflation rate is 15%, for instance, a debt of 1 green dollar 
due ten periods hence will be extinguished at that time by the payment of 
approximately 19 blue cents. X£ the purchasing power of blue money has been 



























































































purchasing power exactly what he expected to receive before the currency 
reform was put into effect.
What that would mean, of course, is that nothing at all is done about 
the depreciation in the greenback's purchasing power. The greenback 
inflation continues as before (although it will eventually become 
unobservable). And this is as it should be for, under the assumptions of 
the neoclassical anticipated inflation model, it would be irrational, 
destructive policy to force the green inflation rate down. All agents have 
fully adjusted to it, all contracts and agreements embody a firm belief in 
its continuance. A policy of disinflation that goes against these firmly 
and unanimously held expectations can only wreak havoc of the worst kind.
What the blueback scheme aims to accomplish, therefore, is simply to 
replace the green money that is subject to the ?r% inflation tax with blue 
money that is not to be taxed in this way. If the exercise is to succeed, 
however, not only must prices stabilize at once but the generally shared 
expectation, after the reform is announced, must be that they will remain 
constant indefinietly. For this to be possible, several requirements have to 
be met.
First, since the reform is predicated on elimination of the inflation 
tax, the government must either replace its inflationary seigniorage with
other taxes or else reduce expenditures so as to produce a budget that is
4consistent with the indefinite pursuit of a non-inflationary policy. If 
nothing is done about the pre-existing deficit, so that it has to be covered 
by printing bluebacks, this would contradict the announced stabilization.
If, then, the blueback goes to an inflation rate of tt%, greenback claims 




























































































power at a 2?r% rate, implying a redistribution of wealth in favor of 
debtors equally as arbitrary and equally as large as the redistribution in 
favor of creditors that the blueback reform is intended to prevent.
Second, since green money is taxed and blue is not, the green money 
will very quickly disappear from circulation. But the amount of real 
balances demanded of the non-taxed money is going to be larger. The 
authorities must accommodate this increased real demand by allowing the 
nominal money supply to increase in order to avoid deflationary pressure on 
the blue price level and consequent adverse effects on employment.
Another requirement for the scheme to be successful, namely government 
credibility, is built into the initial conditions of the model. For an 
inflation to be "fully anticipated", the government must be committed to 
maintaining it at the anticipated rate and this commitment must be utterly 
credible not only as to intent but as to result. In this context, 
therefore, we may suppose that agents redefine their expectations 
immediately to match the announced new fiscal and monetary policies, and 
that each agent is perfectly confident that all others will do likewise^.
This behavior of private sector expectations, in turn, will be confirmed by 
the simultaneous, coordinated halt to price increases which is itself 
compatible with the government's new stabilization program.
In this somewhat abstract context, the blueback idea serves mostly as 
a conceptual tool to diagnose the crippling limitations of the anticipated 
inflation model. If real world inflations were "like" the inflation model, 
they could be cured overnight by bluebacking. All the agonizing over the 
dangers of various disinflation strategies would be pointless. Reducing 




























































































things are that simple because it represents the inflation process as a 
peculiar form of absolutely perfect monetary stability -- peculiar in that 
it does not offer stable purchasing power but instead a stable rate of 
depreciation of purchasing power. Implicitly, it assumes a completely 
believable precommitment by the government -- indeed, a precommitment 
extending to future governments -- to produce a particular inflation path 
and not to deviate from it.
The blueback trick works because we start from a policy regime of the 
most exacting discipline and only the rate of inflation needs changing.
Under the conditions assumed this is easily done. The scheme has the virtue 
of making it clear that in actual inflations it is not the rate but the 
regime that is the problem.
At the same time, the regime of the anticipated inflation model, which 
makes the blueback scheme work, bears so little resemblance to actual 
inflationary regimes that it comes as a surprise that the scheme would ever 
be of any real use.
Indexed Contracts
The "fully anticipated" inflation would not give agents reason to avoid 
nominal contracts. It is only a small step in the direction of real world 
inflations, however, to admit sufficient uncertainty so that at least some 
indexed contracts are concluded. Because price indices are compiled only at 
discrete intervals and published with some delay, indexed contracts will 
tend to have an inertial component, since payments will be adjusted using 
lagged rather than fully contemporaneous changes in the index in question. 




























































































will be of quite minor consequence. In the case of very high inflations -- 
the inflations for which a currency reform is most likely to be part of a 
stabilization plan -- the proportion of the real value of a contract that is 
not corrected by the index can be quite substantial.̂
The blueback scheme can be extended in a relatively easy way to indexed 
contracts. Let t be the date of the currency reform and consider a contract 
arranged at date t-i calling for payment at t+i. In writing the contract, we 
suppose, the parties were trying to arrange a payment of agreed-upon real 
"base value". Let the corresponding nominal value at t-i be Vq "green 
dollars." The contract specifies a certain price index, I, as the means by 
which the nominal payment is to be adjusted for inflation so as to maintain 
its real base value. At date t-i the latest available value for I was k 
"days" old^ and we may suppose that the same length of lag was anticipated 
to occur at t+j. Thus the contractual payment in greenbacks will be
t+j V^+j-k^t-i-k»
The currency reform should seek to preserve the real value of contracts as
of the date of the reform. Just before the stabilization, at t, this payment
8will have an expected real value (at time t prices) of
Et(It+i-k> 1w  - vo ;r-;j
^-i-k (1 +
Note that for some contracts outstanding at t, the date 
t+i-k on which the index used in the adjustment of payments was last 
measured can be earlier than t (i.e., i-k < 0). In this instance, the 
payment *-s treated as a pre-determined sum in greenbacks which is to be
converted into blue money at the factor for date t+j. namely 1/(1 + tt)^. The 





























































































with a real value of
Gt+j/(1 + *>j
B . - V t+j o
t+j-k
t-i-k
The conversion thus corrects for the unforeseen shift in the inflation rate 
at t and makes the real payment equal to the value expected at that date.
The second case is somewhat more complicated. Suppose that, since the 
date of the reform, price indices are measured in stable monetary units 
(that is the indices are computed from collected prices quoted in 
bluebacks). If, then, the reform failed to require a correction for the lag 
in the indices, the contract would require a payment of
Bu - v  _ v __
c+j 0 i ° l !
t-i-k t t-i-k
The right-hand expression makes clear the consequences of the indexing lag: 
the adjustment formula is based on the movements of the index over i+k 
"days” of high inflation (between t-i-k and t) and i-k days of low inflation 
(between t and t+i-k), while between the original date of agreement and the 
payment date there were actually i. days before the reform and j. days after. 
Thus the lag "carries forward" the correction for the pre-reform inflation 
rate to payments to be made after prices have been stabilized. More 
precisely, the real value of the payment that was originally expected can be 
written:
Et-i(V  - Vo
Vi^t+j-k5
(1 + *>t-i-k





























































































If, therefore, the reform specifies that the payment in bluebacks is to 
be calculated as
BCt+j -  BUt+j/ (1+*)k
(i.e., making the conversion into the new currecy using the blue/green 
exchange rate for date t+k. since k is the lag of the indexing formula), the 
sum due will be:
Bc _ v°
t+j
V i - k  (1 + 1°
and the correction made will prevent an unintended real wealth transfer from 
the debtor to the creditor.
The calculation assumes that the authorities imposing the reform know 
what inflation rate is generally expected at time t: E ^ jt) , and use this 
rate for the conversions. If this rate were different from the one 
originally anticipated, Et(7r) * Et the correction will, of course, not
restore the originally anticipated real value to the contract. This 
illustrates a general feature of the blueback reform, namely, that capital 
gains and losses incurred prior to t are treated as "bygones" --the reform
only prevents those that would be brought about by the abrupt 
9stabilization. Similarly, if the index chosen by the contracting parties 
has diverged from some more generally accepted deflator for "real purchasing 
power", the reform treats this as a realization of a relative price risk 
accepted by the parties at the outset and a feature of the contract, 
therefore, that should not be interfered with. Finally, the actual and 
originally expected real values of the payment may fail to coincide because 



























































































Although a correction for these may be desirable in principle, it is almost 
certainly not feasible in practice.
Credibility
The assumption of complete credibility on part of the monetary 
authorities may fit naturally into the neoclassical model of fully 
anticipated inflation, but it seldom if ever fits the actual circumstances 
surrounding very high inflations. We have used this assumption above in 
explaining the elemental principles of the blueback reform but, as we 
proceed (ever so cautiously) in the direction of greater realism, it needs 
to be reconsidered.
To see how it enters in, consider some of the features of the 
conversion mechanism:
The reform pre-determines the "crawling exchange rate" between the two 
currencies -- or, equivalently, the proportional discount to be applied to 
previously contracted nominal payments -- for dates beyond t^. In practice, 
the conversion rate need not be announced in advance for all time to come; 
leaving the conversion rate beyond some horizon date "to be announced later" 
offers some protection against the risk that a later resurgence of inflation 
will distort the real outcome of the reform. Still, the rate must initially 
be set for some period ahead. The conversion, then, only acts "neutrally", 
as intended, if the price level effectively stops rising during the time for 
which the conversion rates have been pre-announced.
As long as price level stability is maintained, the conversion will act 
only on nominal values of payments, irrespective of the nature of the 




























































































otherwise modify agreements previously made -- the "real" provisions of 
contracts are left unchanged. Note, in particular, that interest rate 
differentials are maintained.
Whether the price level can be stabilized, even if only for a 
transitional period, depends in large part on whether people believe it will 
be stabilized. In order for the blueback scheme to be viable, it is probably 
necessary that the public is confident that large wealth redistributions 
will in fact be avoided. This can only be the case if it is quite clear that 
inflation will stop, at least for some time.^ The stabilization of 
expectations is obviously a condition for spot prices (and other prices not 
fixed by earlier contracts) to stabilize. But is is also required in order 
to deal with already outstanding contracts if strong public resistance to 
the conversion scheme is to be avoided.
The announcement of credible fiscal and monetary measures that will be 
seen to avoid the monetization of fiscal deficits over the conversion period 
is, in all probability, a necessary condition for private sector nominal 
expectations to stabilize. But such measures may not be sufficient. In the 
actual circumstances of high inflation, people are apt to use a variety of 
inflation "theories" as bases for forming their inflationary expectations; 
the government may need to provide a corresponding variety of "anchors" for 
their expectations. Some kind of transitional incomes policies -- even a 
general price freeze -- may be required in order to signal the strong
commitment of the authorities to "enforce" a period of price stability to
12
11




























































































Contracts in high inflations.
High inflations are not steady processes. Typically, the "average" 
inflation rate and relative prices are both highly variable. Although people 
spend much time and effort gathering information, they are unable to 
anticipate price movements with any precision. Their uncertainty about the 
real value of nominal sums blows up very rapidly with distance from the 
present. Effective planning horizons become very short. They know that their 
best inflation forecast for the month ahead can very easily be off by 
several percentage points. The very meaning of "the" inflation rate is
blurred for them by the volatility of relative prices. The likely forecast
13error cumulates to much larger figures as they look further ahead so that 
nominal contracts made over anything but very short periods appear 
forbiddingly risky.
In high inflations, agents have several options: they can simply avoid
certain transactions, they can choose to make shorter contracts or they can 
rely on indexing clauses. In fact, all of these strategies are to be 
observed, in different combinations depending upon the concrete situation. 
But, no matter what strategies are adopted, the real effects of price 
instability cannot be eliminated.
For some kinds of transactions, renegotiations are particularly costly. 
In the case of housing rentals, or recurrent customer-supplier relationships
and,in particular, labor contracts, the parties will normally want an
14agreement that covers more than just a few weeks or months. Since, in a 
high inflation, expected errors in predicting the price level over periods 
of such length are large, there is practically no alternative to indexing 



























































































There are several problems with indexing, however. One of them, 
obviously, is the choice of the basket of goods whose price will be used to 
adjust the value of payments, when there are several available proxies for 
"the" price level. People are then led to take implicit bets on the 
performance of indices, a "speculative" activity most often unrelated to 
the main purpose of the transaction. Although most contracts are linked to 
indices such as the CPI, a variety of other formulas are also found in use; 
this diversity may reflect the existence of inconsistent forecasts of 
relative price movements.
The reporting lag is another complication. Indexing is backward­
looking, which means that the purchasing power of payments changes when the 
inflation rate fluctuates. There are, of course, prices (such as the 
exchange rate) that are almost continuously measured, so that 
contemporaneous indexing could be obtained by linking to those prices. But 
"dollarization" of contracts has drawbacks since the real exchange rate is 
apt to be volatile in high inflations. For most people, maintaining 
constant purchasing power over a basket of foreign goods is of little or no 
help if, in so doing, their command over the domestic goods that are the 
stuff of daily existence is rendered more variable.^ Typically, 
dollarization only becomes a more or less universal practice in the limiting 
case of true hyperinflation, when the variability of inflation has become 
extreme, and when the prices of domestic goods also tend to be quoted in 
terms of foreign currencies.
Shortening the length of contracts is a natural response when 
information about future conditions is very unreliable. For short horizons, 




























































































indices) a simple adjustment using the past inflation rate will do as well. 
Short contracts, then, are written in nominal terms, and incorporate the 
price expectations of the transactors. In erratic inflations, individuals 
are likely to form quite different expectations from one another. There is 
then no clearcut way to establish what "real" result was anticipated by the 
parties to a contract and no possibility of establishing an objective 
standard of fairness that could be imposed by the courts. Given the 
heterogeneity of expectations, the real outcome cannot possibly fulfill them 
all.
Some contracts take a "mixed" form, in which payments are index- 
adjusted at relatively long intervals, and remain fixed in nominal terms 
between the moments when these adjustments are made. A common practice, in 
some countries, is that of quarterly or half yearly wage raises linked to 
the past increase in the CPI, with constant money wages in the meantime.
This produces a awtooth pattern in the real value of payments and can, when 
the index-adjustments are not synchronized, give rise to large differences 
in the real price of the same good or service on the same date.
High inflation economies differ from one another with regard to the way 
in which contracts are typically made. What contracting strategies will 
predominate depend on the magnitude of the inflation, on the institutional 
structure of the country in question and also on its previous experience 
with monetary instability. For example, in Brazil and Israel, indexation 
was formally introduced in a wide variety of financial contracts (see 
Simonsen [1983], Fisher [1985]). In Argentina, although indexing was often 
used^, it was much less widespread. Instead, financial assets were held 




























































































currencies Also, while in Brazil (with an inflation rate on the order of 
15% per month at the beginning of 1986) non-synchronous wage-adjustments 
based on an explicit indexing formula were made every six months, the 
practice in Argentina by early 1985 (when the inflation rate oscillated 
between 20 and 30% per month) was of monthly increases, often without any 
explicit linkage to the CPI.
Irrespective of these differences, contracts will carry a "memory" of 
past conditions, be it in the form of backward looking indexation or of 
expectations formed at a previous date. At any given moment, there is a 
stock of outstanding agreements; the real value of the payments resulting 
from them will be affected by the history of price level changes from the 
dates the respective contracts were concluded. In high inflations, this 
memory shortens --as the length of contracts shortens; only in 
hyperinflations does it reach the vanishing point.
Currency Reforms in Practice: Argentina
The first monetary reform of the type discussed here was that 
implemented as part of the Argentinian "Austral Plan" in June 1985. The 
system used to convert debts was directly inspired by the "blueback" scheme 
(cf. Heymann (1986, 1987). The Austral shock stabilization also included, 
among other measures, a general price-wage freeze and an end to Central Bank 
credits to the Treasury. The announcement of the stabilization program was 
by and large unexpected; private decisions made before the reform reflected
the general belief that inflation would continue to run at a very high rate
18at least for some time to come. The inflation rate (measured by CPI) had 



























































































in February and a maximum of 30.5% in June. The stabilization attempt 
achieved an abrupt deceleration: through the second half of 1985, CPI growth 
averaged 3% per month.
The monetary reform was established by a government decree, later 
confirmed by Congress. Its main features were the following:
i) A new monetary unit, the Austral, was created to replace the Peso 
Argentino. Currency, bank current accounts and savings deposits payable 
on demand were converted into the new unit at a rate of 1000 pesos per 
Austral. Since all prices were also divided by the same factor and 
immediately expressed in australes, this simply took zeros off the 
currency. The peso became no more than a transitory unit of account 
for debts originally defined in that currency.
ii) Nominal obligations denominated in pesos and due after the reform 
date were to be settled in australes at a conversion rate that depended 
upon the day of payment. Initially, these rates were announced for the 
first 45 days following the reform and were based on a monthly
19depreciation rate for the peso relative to the austral of 29%.
(Later, new conversion rates were announced that tried to approximate 
the pre- vs. post-reform inflation differential). The initial 
conversion table was based on the assumption that, since most 
outstanding contracts were of quite recent origin, it was appropriate 
to make the peso price of the austral grow at approximately the 
inflation rate of the period immediately preceding the reform. The 
conversion scheme was to be applied to all payments resulting from 
contracts oustanding at the date of the reform, irrespective of the 





























































































pensions were to be adjusted in June and settled in australes (at the
201000 tO 1 rate). For time deposits (antedating the reform) and other 
obligations with an explicit interest rate, the sum payable in pesos 
was to be calculated as stated in the contract and then converted into 
australes according to the conversion scale. Thus the interest rate in 
australes (for the post-reform part of the time-span of a contract) 
would equal the difference between the nominal peso interest rate and 
the 29% per month growth-rate of the peso/austral conversion factor. In 
some instances, this calculation could result in interest rates in the 
new currency becoming negative; since negative real rates were often 
observed during the inflation, no provision was made to prevent this 
from occurring.
iii) The reform maintained all indexing clauses as they stood in the
respective contracts. Payments calculated on the basis of index-values
21measured prior to the reform, were to be treated as peso values and 
be subject to conversion into australes by the factor of the payment 
date. The last payment determined in this fashion would serve as the 
basis for future adjustments to be made according to the escalation 
formula incorporated in the contract. This was designed to eliminate 
the "carry-over" of past inflation due to indexing lags (in the way
outlined above), without otherwise modifying the contents of the
22specific contract.
As could be expected, the currency reform provoked lively debate. 
Interestingly enough, however, neither the general design of the conversion 
scheme nor the specific rate of depreciation of the old currency implicit in 




























































































raised concerned the neutrality (or lack of it) of the conversion as applied
to specific types of transactions and also the difficulties, as perceived in
23some quarters, in applying the mechanism to indexed contracts. Among the
24issues raised were arguments challenging the fairness of the conversion 
scheme for certain types of nominally determined payments. For example:
i) The reform specified that the conversion to australes be made using 
the factor corresponding not to the date when oayment was due but to 
the date when payment was actually made (after adding interest or 
punitive charges as specified in the contract). Many creditors found 
this provision to their disadvantage.
ii) Some holders of time deposits complained that, while a reduction in 
interest rates could have been appropriate, it was unfair to "deflate" 
the capital value (including accumulated interest) of deposits as was 
done by the reform. This complaint was more insistent in the
(relatively few) cases where the conversion resulted in a negative
25nominal rate of return.
iii) Some creditors claimed that the sums they were due to receive "did 
not incorporate inflationary expectations" and, therefore, should not 
be subject to "deflation". This argument was made for a variety of 
payments including, for instance, lawyers' fees (for example, Alterini 
[1985]).
iv) Similarly, some debtors complained that "exorbitant" nominal 
interest rates charged before the reform remained as high in real terms 
after the conversion.
Quite possibly, some objections were motivated simply by "money illusion".




























































































different one, namely, that the reform was "blind" and did not attempt to 
restore justice to contracts and agreements distorted by the previous
inflation. Implicitly, what was demanded was a new legal avenue for the case
26by case "reopening" of contracts. But the conversion scheme was not 
designed to enforce some independently defined standard of fairness on the 
outcomes of contracts but to replicate, as closely as possible, the real 
outcomes that would have resulted had the pre-reform inflation continued as 
expected.
27The longer-term, indexed contracts did present a problem since the 
sharp acceleration of inflation in the years preceding the Austral plan had 
caused significant distortions which the conversion scheme simply 
perpetuated. Whereas these distortions were already present before the 
reform, it is equally obvious that the actual terras of these contracts did
not match those originally intended. This is one area in which a case by
28case redefinition of contract terms might possibly be attempted.
Actually, many contracts of this type were voluntarily renegotiated so as to 
more or less synchronize price adjustments with payments dates and thus 
avoid indexing lags. This was done, in particular, with public sector 
purchasing contracts.
Despite these problems and reactions, the austral conversion was on 
the whole uneventful and proved useful in avoiding the redistributive 
effects of the abrupt stabilization that would otherwise have occurred.. The
debate surrounding it faded away rather quickly, leaving no lasting legacy





























































































Shortly after the Argentine program, Brazil and Peru also attacked
their inflations with "heterodox shock" programs; in both cases a conversion 
 ̂ 30scheme was put into effect . In Peru, the conversion scale was used only 
for obligations that did not carry explicit interest charges; interest rates 
on bank deposits and loans, on the other hand, were reduced by government 
dictate as from the day of the start of the plan, without resort to 
conversion. The Brazilian scheme was more comprehensive (see for example 
Pelaez (1986)). Nominal obligations were converted into the new currency 
(the cruzado) using a scale similar to that used in Argentina. The main 
difference was that the conversion factor (by which the cruzado price of the 
old cruzeiro grew at 14.5% per month, which approximated the inflation rate 
previous to the reform) was preannounced in Brazil for a period of one 
entire year -- with the implicit presumption that cruzado inflation would be 
zero over this long a period! All indexed debts (with the exception of 
savings accounts), most notably government bonds, were converted into 
cruzados at the date of the reform, with their value adjusted to that date 
according to the corresponding formula, and were then to remain fixed 
(without further indexing) in nominal terms; furthermore, indexation was 
forbidden for new contracts of less than one year's duration.
Wages and housing rentals, which prior to the Cruzado Plan had been 
adjusted through "mixed" indexed-nominal formulas, were to be converted so 
that their cruzado amount came to approximate in real terms their average 
values over the latest pre-reform period of length equal to the interval 
between index-adjustments. Thus, for example, wages stemming from contracts 




























































































months previous to the reform were expressed in prices of the date of the 
reform by "inflating” the sums in question by the CPI change since the date
received; the average of the values thus obtained was established as the new
31wage in Cruzados . It may be noted that this system left open the 
possibility of nominal wage reductions, for contracts that had just 
undergone an indexing adjustment and for which, therefore, earnings were 
near their peaks'^.
The various conversion schemes differed in their specifics in part 
because the concrete problems that had to be faced were not the same:
Brazil, for example, had to find a formula suitable for its system of half- 
yearly nonsynchronized wage adjustments whereas Argentina had to deal with 
monthly, simultaneous increases. But, although the reforms were of the 
same general type, some conceptual differences can also be identified. The 
Argentine scheme was more concerned to define a uniform mechanism that could 
be used independently of the nature of the transaction and to leave 
unchanged the main features of the terms established by the parties in the 
contracts while the Brazilian reform, for example, suspended most indexation 
clauses.
The preconditions for reform
The programs of which these reforms were a part did not achieve 
sustained stabilization: after some time, inflation rates returned again to
high levels. The eventual failures have no bearing on the appraisal of the 
conversion schemes, however. Monetary reforms of this kind can do no more 
than smooth the initial transition. Experience has now shown that they can 



























































































could hardly have been attempted without them. Monetary reforms are neither 
magical solutions nor irrelevant gadgets: in the right circumstances, they
can help to bring down the inflation rate with dramatic swiftness and thus 
make stabilization less difficult to achieve.
What then are the right circumstances? They do not make a broad class. 
After one is done defining the wrong circumstances, what remains is a rather 
narrow window of opportunity.
33Both backward- and forward-looking conditions need to be considered 
The backward-looking questions are: How many past states of expectation, 
embodied in still outstanding contracts, do we have to deal with? How 
coherent were they (i.e., to what degree were individual expectations 
consistent)? By how much did they diverge from one another? Looking forward, 
the questions are: How far into the future do people at present have well- 
defined and reasonably consistent price expectations? Can we infer what they 
are with reasonable reliability? What future price path will the government 
be able to "guarantee"? For how long?
Consider, first, the two opposite cases of hyperinflation and quite 
moderate inflation. For hyperinflations, the blueback idea is simply 
irrelevant. A hyperinflation leaves no surviving legacy of the past monetary 
regime. A scheme designed to cope with inflationary "inertia" is superfluous 
when contract-embodied memory and foresight both become "the ghosts of 
departed quantities" (as bishop Berkeley said about derivatives). In this 
respect, stabilization efforts in a hyperinflation start with a clean
! .  34slate
For moderate inflations (in the lower double digits, say) memory and 




























































































obligations acquired or entered into many years ago and/or with many years 
still to run will exist in large volume. Contracts that have a long term to 
maturity require a "greenback-to-blueback" conversion scale that extends 
far into the future. That prospect raises two problems. First, the 
government may not be able to hold any given trend of blue prices 
indefinitely. Of course, the rate of depreciation of green money need not be 
announced in advance for more than a limited period. This would retain the 
flexibility to adjust later for changes in the post-reform inflation rate.
But a system that necessitates dictating an officially sanctioned 
inflationary expectation to be applied to "old" contracts long after the 
reform would create an unrequited focal point for political pressures of 
every kind and become a source of endless recriminations and disputes.
Second, the choice of which inflationary expectation to legitimate becomes 
more and more difficult the farther into the future it has to be projected. 
Using the blueback scheme entails projecting a particular "expected" time- 
path of "green" inflation forward as the basis for calculating the real 
outcomes of contracts that will be established in terms of "blue" money. A 
monetary policy to stabilize the blue price level will then validate this 
particular expectation and disappoint all others. The question whether this 
can or cannot be justified is a quitessentially political one.
The blueback scheme takes the state of expectations as of the date of 
the reform as the one which is to be legitimized. This entails treating the 
capital gains and losses due to past inflation as bygones. But what people
now expect and what they think they have a right to expect are not always 
35the same thing . Any government that itself strives for legitimacy cannot 




























































































forever bygones." Some past state of expectation, embodied in a substantial 
volume of still outstanding contracts, may have a better claim to legitimacy 
than today's expectations. People on nominal pensions, for example, may be 
resigned to the expectation of continued inflation but still feel strongly 
that they have a right to expect that the erosion in the real value of 
"green" pensions be stopped rather than made permanent. The heavy, complex 
overhang of past states of expectation will mean that gradual disinflation 
is preferred to shock stabilization in dealing with moderate inflations.
Between moderate and hyperinflations we are left with the high 
inflations which have shortened contracts and, therefore, shortened both the 
past and the future that has to be taken into account. But the erratic 
variability of high inflations that has this effect also increases the 
chance that agents form inconsistent expectations of the real value they 
agree to pay or to receive through a nominal contract. It also causes more 
frequent changes in these expectations as the parties reevaluate their 
beliefs of yesterday. For certain types of agreements, they will then take 
resort to index clauses, but swings in the inflation rate will cause the 
real outcomes of such contracts to vary as well (since the adjustment 
formula hardly ever uses fully contemporaneous prices). In an erratic high 
inflation, therefore, the status quo at the time of the stabilization does 
not have well-defined expectational properties. It is then unclear what 
standard should be applied to correct contracts -- or if this should be 
tried at all.
This leaves a type of high, but not too high, inflations (in the range 
of two digits per month, say). In addition, one needs an inflationary 





























































































before shock stabilization is tried. This period of some stability in the
inflation rate has to be fairly lengthy in relation to the contract lengths 
36that remain common. This was -- more or less -- the starting point of the 





























































































*U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), Buenos Aires and 
University of California, Los Angeles.
■^Government credibility by itself does not necessarily solve all 
problems of coordinating a simultaneous and consistent deceleration of all 
prices. But this complication can be deferred at this point.
2For previous expositions of the "blueback" idea, cf. Leijonhufvud 
(1983a, 1983b). The idea is also used in the discussion following 
Leijonhufvud (1977), cf. p. 323.
3To speak of "stabilizing" a quasi-neutral inflation is, indeed, self­
contradictory. It is more accurate, as we will argue, to think of the 
experiment simply as abolishing the tax on cash-balances.
4Under the very strong foresight assumptions made in the particular 
context of the anticipated inflation model, this consistency requirement can 
be stated simply in present value terms. A commitment by the incredibly 
credible government to raise the requisite tax proceeds at some future time 
however distant will suffice to convince agents that the present values of 
government expenditures and taxes are balanced. In more realistic 
situations, governments with a history of inflation behind them had better 
bestir themselves and close their flow-deficits without much delay!
^The "expectations of expectations" problem of Phelps, in other words, 
should not be of concern in the postulated context. Cf. E.S. Phelps (1983).
^Consider an inflation running at a monthly rate of 30%, for instance.
Let the price index be compiled at monthly intervals and suppose that a 
contract calls for payment in mid-month. If both parties expected the 
inflation to continue at the 30%/month rate at least up to this mid-month 
date and had agreed to terms embodying a correction for this, then an abrupt 
stabilization would entail a redistribution from debtor to creditor 
amounting to 15% of the real value of the contract.
^Some indices do not reflect prices at a particular date but rather 
time averages. For these indices, we will assume that they give values 
equivalent to instantaneous measures at the mean date of the reporting period.
g
Et(I . , ) denotes the value of I that the index is expected at time t 
to take at frfj-k; with the exceptions noted in the text (where k>j), the 
realization of this index cannot possibly be known at t, of course. Indeed, 




























































































It is possible that under certain conditions it might be found 
preferable to attempt to take into account the state of expectation at the 
original date of contract. As will become clear, however, this would not 
only create horrendous complications in procedure but, in most instances, 
also leave a legacy of disputes.that could threaten the legitimacy of the 
entire stabilization plan.
■^Other schemes to deal with contracts through monetary reform have 
been proposed. In particular, Arida and Lara Resende (1985) propose the 
issue of a new currency whose price in terms of old money would be defined 
by indexing to the price level in the old currency. In principle, this makes 
the exchange rate between the two moneys a variable rather than a pre­
defined constant. This might seem to hold out the promise of escaping the 
need to guarantee price-level stability after the reform (although it would 
reintroduce the indexing lag problem if the inflation rate of the old money 
does not remain constant). But, since it is likely that the old (taxed) 
money will very quickly disappear from circulation, making the corresponding 
price index meaningless, the conversion rate thereafter would have to be 
established by fiat -- just as in the blueback scheme.
■^At this point the reader should go back and resume reading at the 
beginning of the paragraph!
12The public will be bound by law to accept the conversion of private 
contracts. If this is enforced without an equally "binding" guarantee of 
stable "blue" prices, the reform will sow dissension and resistance. Since 
controls are both costly and obviously difficult to sustain for prolonged 
periods, this limits the length of the transition period over which the 
conversion scheme can be applied. Hence, the scheme is better suited for 
high than for moderate inflations since, in the former, contracts will be 
for shorter durations (see below).
We are dealing here only with the conditions under which a "blueback" 
reform may be successful -- not with the more general problem of the 
conditions for successful stabilization. The point that incomes policies may 
be required in order for the currency reform to be applicable is rather 
incidental to the case to be made for their use in "shock" programs which 
rests mainly on their role in coordinating the expectations and thus 
pricing behavior of the public. Cf., for example, Heymann (1986) and 
Machinea and Fanelli (1987).
13To quote inflation rates in percent per year strikes people living 
under these conditions as meaningless. When the Austral Plan was first 
announced, European and North-American newspapers and newsmagazines tried to 
explain to their readers what the situation immediately prior to the reform 
was like. In so doing, most of them chose to translate Argentinian inflation 
rates into annual figures -- and produced estimates that were up to 2000 
percentage points apart!
14However, in hyperinflations, wage negotiations, for example, are also 
very short-term (for the German case, cf. Bresciani-Turroni [1937] and 




























































































indexing formulas that share the risk in a mutually agreeable manner. 
Nonetheless, it remains true that, as inflation increases, some types of 
contracts shorten much less readily than others.
^5The markets that are first dollarized, in fact, are not the ones in 
which the continuous availability of an index-measure would be particularly 
beneficial. Dollarization tends to spread first in the sale of purchase of 
housing, for instance, i.e., in markets where people are making major 
wealth-placements for some length of time.
■^Frenkel (1984) found that, in many cases, wages followed an 
(implicit) backward-looking monthly indexing rule. By mid-June 1985, 
salaries in the government were being adjusted by 80% of the CPI increase in 
the previous month.
■^By mid-1985, 20% of interest bearing deposits in banks were indexed; 
the other 80% consisted of savings accounts and time deposits, mostly with 
30 days maturity or less. One year later (during a period of relatively low 
inflation), the share of indexed deposits had declined to 3% but time 
deposits for 45 days or longer were still only 4% of the total. Most loans 
made outside the banking system carried a fixed nominal interest rate and 
had very short maturities (often 7 days, and almost always, less than one 
month).
18General discussions of the Austral Plan can be found, for instance, 
in Heymann (1986) , Machinea and Fanelli (1987), and Gerchunoff and Bozalla 
(1987).























Note, however, that wages were frozen following this adjustment, 
while for other contracts subject to conversion indexing clauses remained in 





























































































These included adjustments made using the June 1985 price indices on 
the presumption that most of that month's inflation would be due to price 
movements before the start of the stabilization program.
22As mentioned above, some contracts have a mix of nominal and indexed 
features. In Argentina a common example was that of rental agreements 
adjusted by indexation every three months but with nominally fixed payments 
in the intervening months. Under inflationary conditions, such contracts 
acquire a sawtooth pattern of real payments. The Argentinian conversion 
scheme for these contracts was such that, after the indexing lag was taken 
care of, the real payment at the "sawtooth peak" (i.e., immediately after 
the escalator clause had been applied) would be equal to that of the 
previous peak. With a lower inflation rate between indexation adjustments, 
this meant that the average value of payments would be higher. This matter 
was not crucial in Argentina; it was quite important in Brazil where this 
kind of contract was much more common and included most labor contracts (see 
below).
23Shortly after the reform announcement, the government had 
to issue clarifying norms that specified more explicitly how the 
adjustment lag for any given index-contract should be determined 
and what conversion factor should be used for the resulting payments.
24Much of the subsequent literature has dealt with the 
reform from the legal point of view. See, for example, Adrogue 
(1985), Eilbaum (1985), Moisset de Espanes et al. (1985), Trigo 
Represas (1985).
25The minimum interest rate for time deposits in banks just before June 
15 was 28% per month, i.e., less than the 29% per month depreciation rate of 
the peso relative to the austral. Deposits made at the 28% rate would end up 
having earned negative nominal interest ex post.
26Contracts could of course, be renegotiated or challenged in court 
both before and after the reform. Through its previous experience with 
volatile inflations, the Argetinian judicial system had in fact evolved a 
"doctrina de imprevisibilidad" that allowed for the revision of contracts in 
the event of unforeseen price level changes. Argentine law, therefore, was 
not completely insistent that "a peso is a peso". This "unforeseeability 
doctrine" had been applied mostly in cases of inflationary accelerations.
The point of Austral reform, however, was to avoid triggering 
widespread litigation. The conversion scheme defined a general rule for 
dealing with contracts of different types which could be used as a basis- 
either for direct agreement between the parties or, if necessary, for 
decisions by the courts.
27Initially, some people objected that since escalation clauses simply 
reflected price changes, indexed sums should not be converted. This 




























































































An alternative conversion scheme might have made the conversion 
factor correspond, not to the inflation differential between the reform date 
and the payment date, but to that between the date of origin of the contract 
and the payment date. This kind of scheme, however, would not only be 
complicated by the proliferation of conversion scales (i.e., one for every 
contract origination date) but also by disputes over the dates at which 
specific obligations would be considered as having originated. Contracts 
that undergo partial revisions while in effect will present this kind of 
ambiguity and such revisions are apt to occur frequently in high inflations.
Neither the conversion scheme that was actually used nor this 
hypothetical alternative is entirely satisfactory for these long-lived 
contracts. This demonstrates again that a more or less steady inflation rate 
for some period prior to the reform is a condition for the scheme to be 
viable. How long this period of steadiness needs to be depends on the extent 
to which the age-distribution of outstanding contracts has been shortened by 
the inflation. A currency reform of the "blueback" type had better not leave 
more than a small subset of "long" contracts as special cases.
29The Argentinian inflation remained relatively low for about a year 
following the 1985 stabilization program. Subsequently, it accelerated 
sharply on several occasions. These later spurts seldom affected the 
contracts covered by the reform which had mostly expired. None of the later 
attempts to get inflation under control again used a "blueback" scheme.
There were two strong reasons not to do so. First, these later efforts were 
less likely to achieve stability over some significant period than was the 
1985 program. Second, they were in each instance preceded by periods of 
highly variable inflation rates so that a uniform treatment of contracts 
would have been far less appropriate than in the original case.
30The Brazilian plan is described, for example, in Cardoso and 
Dornbusch(1987) and in Modiano (1987). Israel disinflated abruptly in 1985, 
but the program did not provide for the correction of contracts. It may be 
that the small volume of nominal assets and the importance of dollar-linked 
instruments (which are in effect indexed to the exchange rate so as not to 
be subject to index-lag problems ) made a conversion scheme more or less 
superfluous in this case. For a discussion of Israel's asset structure in 
recent years see Fischer (op cit).
31More precisely, this meant setting the wage in the new currency at 
the value
28
B - (1/6)2G . (p /p .r
c j-0 J J
where (pt/pt_j)
approximates the ratio of the CPI at the moment of the reform (March 1,
1986) to that at the date of the payment t-j. Wages resulting from 
contracts less than six months old were converted by taking the last nominal 
payment (made around the date of the reform), adjusting for an estimate of 
the price increase between the month the contract started and March 1, 1986 



























































































had in an interval of six months if prices grew at a constant rate of 14.4% 
per month. That is:
B = G (---- )e(1/6) 2 ----- - , where t-k was
c c pt.k j-o <1+*)J
the time of origin of the contract, and n the inflation rate just before the 
program used in the calculation. In all cases, the values obtained for 
wages through the conversion were increased by 8%, as a separate measure.
32The special increase of 8% (see the previous note) reduced the number 
of cases in which nominal wages actually ended up lower.
33Recall that the setting in which bluebacking works perfectly is the 
artifical one of the fully anticipated inflation model. In that context, it 
is assumed that the same inflation rate was expected at all past dates 
(relevant to contracts still outstanding at t) for all (relevant) future 
dates, and that all these past states of expectations were "coherent" in the 
sense that individual agents held the same beliefs. Constancy of the 
inflation rate is not necessary, of course. As long as the hypothetical 
economy evolves along some path of perfect nominal foresight, however 
complicated, a blueback scheme could be devised for it.
34From a less narrow standpoint, of course, the hyperinflationary 
process which eliminates "inertia" as a "technical" problem is seen to 
destroy other elements of continuity as well and thus to generate a 
dangerous mix of social anomie and political extremism.
35Cf., also Leijonhufvud (1984), pp. 28-29.
3 .̂ In the Argentinian case, the inflation rate had stayed in the high 
20's (percent/month) for about half a year prior to June 15, 1985 --a long 
period compared to the 30 to 45 day deposits which were the longest purely 
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